Browsing by Subject "Decentralisation"

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    Decentralisation in Zambia, 2011 to 2021: reality or rhetoric? –the underlying drivers and barriers
    (2026) Chileshe, Alexander; Haricharan, Shanildutt; Goldman, Ian
    Over the past two centuries, decentralisation has become a prominent feature of governance reform globally, with a surge in adoption (at least in name) across both developed and developing countries. These reforms have been driven by espoused objectives, including enhancing service delivery, promoting citizen participation, strengthening local development, and advancing democratisation. However, global evidence reveals mixed outcomes, with many decentralisation efforts failing to translate formal commitments into meaningful local governance. These shortcomings stem less from technical design flaws and more from the persistence of entrenched political, institutional, and cultural dynamics that actively shape — and often constrain — the implementation of reforms. In Zambia, on paper decentralisation has remained a consistent policy objective since independence in 1964, with successive post-independence governments expressing rhetorical commitment to devolving power to the people. Despite four major reform phases and several legislative changes, tangible improvements in local development have remained limited. This thesis examines Zambia's decentralisation efforts between 2011 and 2021 through the analytical lens of the Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis (PDPEA) framework. It investigates how structural, institutional, and ideational factors have shaped reform implementation and outcomes. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork in three districts — Mazabuka, Chipata, and Chibombo — this research finds that decentralisation in Zambia has been persistently undermined not merely by technical shortcomings but by a fundamental mismatch between the espoused policy of devolution and the underlying political incentives of the governing elite. Central authorities resist delegating meaningful power out of fear that doing so would weaken their control, particularly in a competitive and ethnically mobilised political landscape. These underlying causes manifest in a range of symptoms: institutional incoherence, the persistence of colonial-era centralisation, informal power dynamics that override formal rules, and limited autonomy at the district level. The strategic deployment of ethnicity and regionalism further distorts reform outcomes, while citizen disengagement and weak downward accountability reduce grassroots pressure for meaningful change. Taken together, these findings challenge technocratic assumptions that legal and administrative reforms alone can deliver effective decentralisation in Zambia; without genuine political will, reforms remain largely symbolic. The research proposes context-sensitive strategies that operate on two fronts. Firstly, to stimulate political will, reforms must shift the incentive structures of ruling elites so that they see tangible benefits from effective decentralisation. This can be done by linking performance-based fiscal transfers to developmental outcomes, demonstrating how empowered local governments can deliver visible gains that enhance regime legitimacy, and building leadership coalitions that anchor reform in widely shared local values. Civic mobilisation and digital transparency can also raise the political costs of resisting devolution, gradually realigning incentives. Secondly, where local autonomy remains limited, adaptive approaches can still carve out space for incremental progress. Civic-led accountability initiatives, citizen monitoring of service delivery, and experimental decentralisation “labs” can test innovative practices within constrained environments, generating evidence and pressure for broader reform over time. These measures help sustain bottom-up demand and demonstrate practical benefits, even when political will is partial or ambivalent. In contributing to broader debates on adaptive governance, the study argues that sustainable decentralisation ultimately requires both transforming entrenched belief systems and activating civic agency, while also recognising the realities of elite resistance. While focused on Zambia, the findings offer transferable insights for other post-colonial contexts grappling with similar decentralisation challenges.
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    Devolution and its effects on health workforce and commodities management – early implementation experiences in Kilifi County, Kenya
    (BioMed Central, 2017-09-15) Tsofa, Benjamin; Goodman, Catherine; Gilson, Lucy; Molyneux, Sassy
    Background: Decentralisation is argued to promote community participation, accountability, technical efficiency, and equity in the management of resources, and has been a recurring theme in health system reforms for several decades. In 2010, Kenya passed a new constitution that introduced 47 semi-autonomous county governments, with substantial transfer of responsibility for health service delivery from the central government to these counties. Focusing on two key elements of the health system, Human Resources for Health (HRH) and Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies (EMMS) management, we analysed the early implementation experiences of this major governance reform at county level. Methods: We employed a qualitative case study design, focusing on Kilifi County, and adapted the decision space framework developed by Bossert et al., to guide our inquiry and analysis. Data were collected through document reviews, key informant interviews, and participant and non-participant observations between December 2012 and December 2014. Results: As with other county level functions, HRH and EMMS management functions were rapidly transferred to counties before appropriate county-level structures and adequate capacity to undertake these functions were in place. For HRH, this led to major disruptions in staff salary payments, political interference with HRH management functions and confusion over HRH management roles. There was also lack of clarity over specific roles and responsibilities at county and national government, and of key players at each level. Subsequently health worker strikes and mass resignations were witnessed. With EMMS, significant delays in procurement led to long stock-outs of essential drugs in health facilities. However, when the county finally managed to procure drugs, health facilities reported a better order fill-rate compared to the period prior to devolution. Conclusion: The devolved government system in Kenya has significantly increased county level decision-space for HRH and EMMS management functions. However, harnessing the full potential benefits of this increased autonomy requires targeted interventions to clarify the roles and responsibilities of different actors at all levels of the new system, and to build capacity of the counties to undertake certain specific HRH and EMMS management tasks. Capacity considerations should always be central when designing health sector decentralisation policies.
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    Devolution and its effects on health workforce and commodities management – early implementation experiences in Kilifi County, Kenya
    (2017) Tsofa, Benjamin; Goodman, Catherine; Gilson, Lucy; Molyneux, Sassy
    BACKGROUND: Decentralisation is argued to promote community participation, accountability, technical efficiency, and equity in the management of resources, and has been a recurring theme in health system reforms for several decades. In 2010, Kenya passed a new constitution that introduced 47 semi-autonomous county governments, with substantial transfer of responsibility for health service delivery from the central government to these counties. Focusing on two key elements of the health system, Human Resources for Health (HRH) and Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies (EMMS) management, we analysed the early implementation experiences of this major governance reform at county level. METHODS: We employed a qualitative case study design, focusing on Kilifi County, and adapted the decision space framework developed by Bossert et al., to guide our inquiry and analysis. Data were collected through document reviews, key informant interviews, and participant and non-participant observations between December 2012 and December 2014. RESULTS: As with other county level functions, HRH and EMMS management functions were rapidly transferred to counties before appropriate county-level structures and adequate capacity to undertake these functions were in place. For HRH, this led to major disruptions in staff salary payments, political interference with HRH management functions and confusion over HRH management roles. There was also lack of clarity over specific roles and responsibilities at county and national government, and of key players at each level. Subsequently health worker strikes and mass resignations were witnessed. With EMMS, significant delays in procurement led to long stock-outs of essential drugs in health facilities. However, when the county finally managed to procure drugs, health facilities reported a better order fill-rate compared to the period prior to devolution. CONCLUSION: The devolved government system in Kenya has significantly increased county level decision-space for HRH and EMMS management functions. However, harnessing the full potential benefits of this increased autonomy requires targeted interventions to clarify the roles and responsibilities of different actors at all levels of the new system, and to build capacity of the counties to undertake certain specific HRH and EMMS management tasks. Capacity considerations should always be central when designing health sector decentralisation policies.
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    Vertical Decentralisation and Urban Service Delivery in South Africa: Does Politics Matter?
    (Wiley, 2014) Cameron, Robert
    Focusing on the case of South Africa, this study examines how decentralisation policies and inter-party politics have affected urban service- delivery responsibilities and resources. Service delivery does not appear to be worse off in Cape Town than in Johannesburg, even though the former is controlled by the opposition Democratic Alliance. While there have been political attempts to undermine the authority of its officials, the fiscal elements are protected by a relatively strong and well-managed department of finance. Consequently, both donors and the national government steer money towards Cape Town because they know it can deliver on its obligations.